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1. Abstract
We present and test a model relating a firm’s idiosyncratic cost, its exporting sta-
tus, and the volatilities of its domestic and export sales. In prior models of trade,
supply costs for domestic and exports were linear and thus additively separable. We
introduce a nonlinear cost function in order to link the domestic and export supply
costs . This theoretical contribution has two new implications for the exporting firm.
First, the demand volatility in the foreign market now directly affects the firm’s do-
mestic sales volatility. Second, firms hedge domestic demand volatility with exports.
The model has several testable predictions. First, larger firms have lower total and
domestic sales volatilities. Second, foreign market volatility increases domestic sales
volatilities for exporters. Third, exporters allocate output across both markets in
order to reduce total sales volatility. We find evidence for these predictions with
Danish firms operating between 1992 and 2006.
IWe are indebted to seminar participants at the University of Copenhagen and the University of
Tennessee for helpful comments that greatly improved this paper. We are grateful for the support
from the Economic Policy Research Network (EPRN). We thank Jakob R. Munch and Rasmus
Jørgensen for considerable help with the Danish data. All errors are our own. Authors can be
contacted via email at daniel.x.nguyen@econ.ku.dk and gschaur@utk.edu.
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2. Introduction
All firms face high volatilities in the domestic market. In addition, exporters en-
counter fickle foreign demands and fluctuating exchange rates in foreign markets.
Whether these foreign sources of volatilities affect an exporter’s domestic supply
volatility depends on the firm’s ability to flexibly adjust its outputs and inputs. This
study presents and tests a model relating a firm’s idiosyncratic costs, its exporting
status, and the volatilities of its domestic and export sales.
In our model, exporting firms face volatile linear demands in both the domestic
and export markets. Unlike previous models of trade with linear demands (Melitz
Ottaviano, 2008, Kneller & Yu 2008), production involves increasing marginal costs.
This cost structure links an exporter’s optimal output allocation across markets; a
demand shock in either market causes the exporter to reallocate output across both
markets. This reallocation does not exist in the standard constant marginal cost
models, where an exporter’s total foreign supply does not affect its marginal cost of
domestic supply.
The model relates size and export status to output volatility, or flexibility.1 Many
predictions are in line with the literature: bigger firms have lower marginal costs
and are more likely to export. Our theory reveals additional adjustment margins
in response to demand fluctuations. First, exporters face volatility on the foreign
market that feeds back to the domestic market due to the linkage in production.
Second, while additional volatility due to exporting tends to increase a firm’s output
volatility, the exporter can hedge high volatilities in one market by reallocating
1Stigler (1939) defines flexibility as the ability to vary output in response to exogenous shocks.
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output to the other market. These two forces work in opposite directions. The net
result may increase or decrease the firm’s total volatility.
We use detailed Danish firm level data encompassing the universe of Danish manu-
facturing firms to test these predictions. We examine 27,000 firms over 16 years. We
have data on sales as well as labor, capital, energy and assets. These data allow us
to test two sets of hypotheses. First, a set of sales volatility specifications examine
the impact of size and exporting on a firm’s output volatilities and the allocation
of output across markets. The second set of specifications examine the impact of
size and export status on the volatility of the local factor demands. These results
are the first firm level predictions that examine exporters’ substitution mechanisms
across markets in international trade and its implications for local factor and goods
markets.
These results have two direct policy implications. First, export promotion programs
look to facilitate firm entry into export markets.2 To this end, a key question is what
makes a successful exporter and what difficulties must new exporters overcome to
successfully compete in foreign markets? Our estimation results show that exporters
have considerable higher domestic and total sales volatility than non exporters. This
is particularly true for medium sized firms that are on the margin of entry into the
export market. This suggests that in addition to economies of scale, flexibility with
respect to market fluctuations is an important factor of exporting and should be on
the menu of recommendations for export promotion. Second, our results shed light
on the impact of exporting on the local factor markets. The higher sales volatility of
2For recent examples see President Obama’s Export Promotion Cabinet:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/business/economy/12trade.html or The Trade Council of
Denmark http://www.um.dk/en/menu/TradeAndInvestment/
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exporters goes hand in hand with a higher volatility in factor demands. This suggests
that factor markets should be structured so that they can absorb this volatility.
Our study fills a gap between the existing International Trade and Industrial Or-
ganization literatures. In the International Trade literature, firms that are subject
to high demand uncertainty relocate closer to the destination market to respond to
demand fluctuations with just in time production (Evans and Harrigan, 2005), or,
shift into a faster but more expensive transportation mix (Aizenman, 2004; Hummels
and Schaur, 2009). Empirical identification of these margins requires rich variation
across source countries, commodities and transport modes. The literature examines
these margins using highly disaggregated trade data. However, corresponding do-
mestic data has not existed beforehand, so the literature does not provide evidence
about the feedback of foreign shocks to domestic output and factor markets. The
industrial organization literature applies a sample of US firms to examine the trade
off between firm size and flexibility with respect to demand uncertainty (Mills, 1984,
1986; Mills and Schumann, 1985). The empirical specifications apply detailed US
firm level sales data, but do not distinguish between export and domestic sales. We
examine the relationship between export and domestic sales activity to fill the gap
between the two literatures.
Previous empirical and simulation studies found evidence at the country level that
trade increases the transmission of shocks across countries and increases business
cycle comovement (e.g (Kose and Yi, 2006), (Kose et. all., 2008)). In addition, world
prices induce business cycle fluctuations in small open economies (Kose, 2001). A
growing literature examines the determinants of volatility at a more disaggregated
industry level. di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008) examine the risk content of trade,
working through the impact of trade openness on individual sectors, changes in the
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comovement between sectors and changes in the pattern of specialization. Other
industry-level studies examine specialization patterns (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003;
Kalemli-Ozcan et. al., 2003) and volatility independently (Raddatz, 2006; Imbs,
2006). We extend this trade and volatility literature by disaggregating to the firm
level. Applying a detailed census of firms we identify a structurally higher domestic
sales volatility for exporting firms. Our model interprets this result as evidence that a
firm’s cost function links the firm’s supplies in the export and domestic markets. This
link may theoretically increase or decrease a firm’s total sales volatility, irregardless
of whether demand shocks are correlated across markets. Firms that export to large
and stable markets have lower total sales volatility than non exporters. Those that
export to small and volatile markets have higher total sales volatility. We find that
firms that export in all periods have lower total sales volatility, while firms that only
export sometimes have higher totals sales volatility.
Buch et. all. (2006) provide firm level evidence for a negative relationship between a
firm’s total sales volatility and trade openness for a sample of German firms located
in the state of Baden Wuerttemberg. We contribute to this finding in several ways.
First, we provide a model that specifies a link between domestic and export sales.
Second, instead of using a selective sample of a particular state in Germany, we
examine a census of Danish firms, alleviating small sample data issues. Given this
data, we find that exporting results in structurally higher volatility of domestic sales.
Our estimation results also show that exporters are more volatile in their labor inputs.
(Krebs et. all., 2005) use individual level survey data to estimate the impact of trade
liberalization on income uncertainty and evaluate the welfare impact. While such an
exercise is beyond this current paper, our results show that exporting status has a
direct and structural impact on the factor demand volatility.
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3. Model
In this section, we examine the behavior of a single firm that can potentially supply
to both a foreign and a domestic market. The marginal cost of the firm’s first unit
of output is β and rises linearly with output. This cost structure delivers interesting
and testable predictions about the output allocation across markets and the feedback
of volatility across output and factor markets.3 The firm faces stochastic domestic
and foreign demands for its output. Under conditions that match the patterns in
the data, we derive the volatility of domestic and foreign supply and show their
relationship to β. Finally, we show how the volatility of domestic, foreign, and total
supply differ between a firm that exports and a firm that does not export.
3.1. Set Up
Firms produce horizontally differentiated varieties and differ from one another via
their initial marginal cost of production. Specifically, firm i produces total output
Q(i) according to the quadratic cost function
c(Q(i)) = H + β(i)Q(i) +
1
2
Q(i)2, (1)
3The challenge of introducing this cost function is to solve the model in general equilibrium. To
obtain intuitive predictions we examine a partial equilibrium where each firm is a monopolist. In
particular, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) examine a linear demand and monopolistic competition
framework, where each firm’s demand intercept is a function of market size, the number of firms
in the market and demand parameters. This implies that a change in the demand parameters for
one group of firms feeds through the intercept to all firms. We take the variance in the intercept
as exogenous, but think of the volatility as if it includes the general equilibrium adjustments in
the intercepts. We chose this approach, because our objective is to examine how firms adjust to
multiple sources of volatility. Increasing marginal costs make this problem interesting.
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where β > 0 is the firm’s idiosyncratic initial marginal cost of production and H is
the fixed cost of production. 4
Firm i can potentially supply to both a domestic and a foreign market. It ships the
quantity qd(i) to the domestic market and realizes the price pd(i) = D− qd(i), where
the reservation price D ∈ (D,D) is bounded and random with variance σ2D. D is
common to all firms. A firm can also pay a sunk entry cost of exporting, K, and
export the quantity qf (i) to the foreign market. Exporting firms realize the price
pf = F − qf (i), where the reservation price F ∈ (F , F ) is bounded and random with
variance σ2F . F is also common to all exporting firms. D > 0 and F > 0 so that
there is always some demand at zero prices.
Firm i’s foreign and domestic quantities supplied must sum to its total production
output: Q(i) = qd(i) + qf (i). The firm’s objective is to allocate quantity across the
domestic and foreign markets to maximize profits. The firm solves this problem
backwards. First it examines the optimal supply for all potential realizations of de-
mand and export status. With that information at hand, the firm compares expected
profits to entry costs and decides which markets to supply.
3.2. Profit Maximization
To simplify notation, we examine a firm with β(i) = β and write q(i)f = qf , q(i)d =
qd. This firm maximizes profits
Π(qd, qf ) = (D − qd)qd + (F − qf )qf −H −K − β(qd + qf )− 1
2
(qd + qf )2 (2)
4We assume a quadratic coefficient of 12 to simplify the exposition. Our theory shows how cost
linkages transmit demand volatility across markets when the marginal cost increases with output.
Our setup, in which ∂c(q)∂q = β + q, is the most concise approach to illustrate these linkages.
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w.r.t. the optimal quantity on the domestic market qd and foreign market qf such
that qd ≥ 0 and qf ≥ 0. The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is
L(qd, qf , λ1, λ2) = (D−qd)qd+(F−qf )qfH−K−β(qd+qf )− 1
2
(qd+qf )2+λ1q
d+λ2q
f .
The first order conditions are
∂L
∂qd
= D − 3qd − β − qf + λ1 = 0 (3)
∂L
∂qf
= F − 3qf − β − qd + λ2 = 0 (4)
∂L
∂λ1
= qD ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ1qD = 0 (5)
∂L
∂λ2
= qF ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ2qF = 0 (6)
The firm must decide whether to supply a positive quantity to each of the two
markets. There are four cases to consider:
1. Supply Neither Market: λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, q
d = 0, qf = 0
2. Supply only the Export Market: λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0, q
d = 0, qf > 0
3. Supply only the Domestic Market: λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0, q
d > 0, qf = 0
4. Supply Both Markets:λ1 = 0, λ2 = 0, q
d > 0, qf > 0
Case 1 is unobserved. Case 2 is inconsistent with the data; all firms we observe supply
at least the domestic market. Case 3 suggests that a firm may abstain from exporting
under some demand realizations. Instead of considering this case separately, we use
our sunk entry cost of exporting, K, to embed case 3 into case 4. We assume that
any firm will supply both markets in each period if there are no entry costs. The
sunk entry cost K will dissuade small firms with high costs (firms with high β) from
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exporting. 5 Our assumption implies that for given Demand probability distributions,
the relevant range of β is sufficiently low such that, sans fixed costs, the firm will
supply to both markets for all realizations of the shock.
From (3) and (4) solve for the optimal quantities
qd =
3
8
D − 1
8
F − 1
4
β (7)
qf =
3
8
F − 1
8
D − 1
4
β. (8)
From (7) and (8), note that qd > 0 and qf > 0 iff
D >
1
3
F +
2
3
β (9)
F >
1
3
D +
2
3
β (10)
Figure 1 shows the intuition for this case. For reservation prices on the foreign
market that make exporting optimal, the firm supplies both markets such that the
marginal revenue in each market equals the marginal cost of producing the total
output Q = qd + qf . The key insight is that due to the trade off in production and
marginal revenues across markets, the optimal supply for the domestic market is a
function of the shock on the foreign market and vice versa. The standard assumption
of constant marginal costs cannot reproduce this link between the two markets. This
has direct implications for the feed back of shocks across output markets, which we
examine in the empirics. Appendix A-2.2 shows that the second order conditions
hold for this case. To examine the impact of entry cost we now derive the expected
profits for this case.
5To see a formal discussion of these cases see appendix A-1
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3.3. Expected Profits
To derive the profits for an exporting firm in a given period, substitute the optimal
quantities for a given realization of the shock (equations (7) and (8)) into the profit
function to obtain the exporter’s profit pie(·) as a function of the domestic and foreign
shocks as well as the cost parameter, β:
pie(D,F, β) =
1
4
[
1
4
(D − F )2 + 1
2
(D − β)2 + 1
2
(F − β)2
]
−H −K. (11)
If there are no entry costs H or K, the right hand side is always positive: the firm
supplies to both domestic and foreign markets. To examine the impact of H and K
on the foreign and domestic markets, we compare equation (11) with the expected
profits of a non exporter. Set qf = 0 in the profit function (2) and optimize with
respect to the domestic supply to obtain the optimal quantity
qd =
1
3
(D − β) (12)
Substitute (12) back into the profit function (sans K) to obtain the non exporter’s
profit pi(·) as a function of the domestic shock,
pi(D, β) =
1
6
(D − β)2 −H. (13)
With the profit functions (11) and (13) at hand we can show the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3.1. The expected profits with exporting decrease relative to the profits
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without exporting as the initial marginal cost β increases,
E(∂[pie(D,F ))− E(pi(D,F ))]
∂β
=
∂E(∆)
∂β
< 0 (14)
Proof Take the expectation of (11) and (13) and subtract E(pi(D,F )) fromE(pie(D,F ))
to obtain
∆ =
1
4
[
1
4
(D − F )2 + 1
2
(D − β)2 + 1
2
(F − β)2
]
− 1
6
(D − β)2 −K (15)
Expand the square terms including β to obtain
∆ =
1
4
[
1
4
(D − F )2 + 1
2
(D2 − 2βD + β2) + 1
2
(F 2 − 2βF + β2)
]
(16)
− 1
6
(D2 − 2βD + β2)−K. (17)
Take the expectation to obtain
E(∆) =
1
4
[
E(
1
4
(D − F )2) + 1
2
(E(D2)− 2βE(D) + β2) + 1
2
(E(F 2)− 2βE(F ) + β2)
]
− 1
6
(E(D2)− 2βE(D) + β2)−K.
Take the derivative with respect to β to obtain
∂E(∆)
∂β
=
1
12
E(D) +
1
6
β − 1
4
E(F ) (18)
From inequality (10), we observe that −(1/4)F + (1/6)β + (1/12)D < 0 if qf >
0. Under case four in which all firms would maximize profit (sans sunk costs) by
supplying to both destinations, qf > 0 for all realization of F,H. Evaluated at the
mean this implies −(1/4)E(F ) + (1/6)β + (1/12)E(D) < 0 
This implies that as the marginal cost increases in β, the benefits from exporting
decrease relative to the profits the firm would realize by supplying only the domestic
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market. The intuition is that the exporter splits the marginal cost decrease from
lowering β over two markets. This implies that the same increase in the quantity,
has a lower negative impact on the prices compared to a non exporter who passes
the entire change in the marginal cost to the domestic market. With this intuition
at hand, the following corollary shows that a sufficiently high fixed cost prevents the
highest cost firms from entry into the foreign market.
Proposition 3.2. For a sufficiently high entry cost to the foreign market K and a
sufficiently low set up cost H, there exists a unique value βd and βe such that all
firms with β > βd don’t supply any of the markets, all firms with βe ≤ β ≤ βd supply
only the domestic market and all firms with β ≤ βe supply the domestic and foreign
markets simultaneously.
Proof First note that if H is large enough such that E(pie(D,F, β = 0)) < 0 and
E(pi(D, β = 0)) < 0, the firm will never supply to either market. This is uninter-
esting. We examine a world where the production setup cost H is sufficiently low
enough that for some positive β, firms find it profitable to produce.
Next, note that for β > 0 the profits of a firm that supplies only the domestic
market (12) strictly decreases for any given realization of D. Therefore, an increase
in β strictly decreases the expected profits E(pi(D, β)) = E
(
1
6
(D − β)2)−H. This
implies that for a sufficiently low level of H there exists a unique βd such that
E
(
pi(D, βd)
) − H = 0. Since the profits are strictly decreasing in β, a firm with
β > βd would not supply to the domestic market. A firm with β ≤ βd supplies to
the domestic market.
A firm with β ≤ βd may also supply to the foreign market. Since we are under case
four, E(pie(D,F, β)) > E(pi(D, β)) if the sunk export entry cost K = 0. A firm will
12
export if the added profits from exporting are greater than the one time sunk cost of
exporting: E(pie(D,F, β))−E(pi(D, β)) > K. We showed in proposition 3.1 that the
difference between E(pie(D,F, β)) − E(pi(D, β) increases as β decreases. Therefore,
there exists a βe such that firms with β < βe will find it profitable to export. 
4. Empirical Predictions
Given the firm’s optimal supply and export decision, we are interested to see how size
and export status impact the volatility of a firm with respect to the domestic, foreign
and total market. Following Mills and Schumann (1985), let us use the coefficient
of variation of output (cvo) as our measure of volatility.6 To obtain predictions we
subsequently derive the volatility of the domestic supply of the exporter and non-
exporter, the foreign supply of the exporter and the total supply of both. We will
use a superscript e to denote exporter-specific coefficients of variation.
We first find the standard deviation of the domestic quantity supplied in equation
(12) and divide it by the expected quantity supplied to obtain
cvo(qd) =
σD
E(D)− β . (19)
Similarly, we can obtain the coefficient of variation of the domestic quantity supplied
by an exporting firm by taking the standard deviation of equation (7) and dividing
it by the expected quantity supplied:
cvoe(qd) =
√
9σ2D + σ
2
F
3E(D)− E(F )− 2β (20)
6The coefficient of variation of some random variable y with variance σ2y and mean E(y) is
defined as cvo(y) =
√
σ2y
E(Y ) .
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Sum the domestic and export quantities supplied by the exporter in (7) and (8) to
find the total output of an exporting firm, Qe = 1
4
D + 1
4
F − 1
2
β. The coefficient of
variation of total output for an exporter is then
cvoe(Qe) =
√
σ2D + σ
2
F
E(D) + E(F )− 2β (21)
With the coefficients of variation of the supplies at hand, we derive a series of pre-
dictions.
Prediction 4.1. For a given firm size, exporters supply the domestic market at a
structurally higher volatility than non-exporters.
The key difference between exporters and nonexporters is that the coefficient of vari-
ation of domestic supply of the exporter (20) is a function of the variance of demand
on the foreign market. This is not the case for the nonexporter (19).
According to (10), a firm is just indifferent of exporting if F = 1
3
D + 2
3
β. Now
suppose E(F ) = 1
3
E(D) + 2
3
β and susbtitute E(F ) into (20) to obtain
cvoe(qD) =
3
√
9σ2D + σ
2
F
E(D)− β . (22)
From (22) it is easy to see that even if there is no variance on the foreign market (σ2F =
0) and the foreign market is just large enough to leave the firm indifferent between
exporting and not exporting (E(F ) = 1
3
E(D) + 2
3
β), the coefficent of variation with
exporting is greater than the coefficient of variation without exporting. 7 This result
7Note that equation (22) defines a lower bound for the structural difference. In our set up the
epxected foreign market size E(F ) must be strictly greater than 13E(D) +
2
3β and the exporter
coefficient of variation (20) increases as the expected foreign market size increases.
14
is intuitive. Consider two firms with the same cost function. The firm that supplies
the foreign and domestic market will supply a lower quantity to the domestic market
than the firm that supplies only the domestic market. By this scale effect, the
volatility of supply on the domestic market increases for the exporter because the
volatility of the demand shocks on the domestic market is the same for both firms.
The null hypothesis for this prediction is the standard set up in the monopolistic
trade models, in which firms supply the domestic and foreign market at constant
marginal cost, c.8 Given our demand structure, the optimal quantity an exporter
would supply on the domestic market is then q = 1
2
(D−c) which realizes the revenues
r = 1
4
(D2−c2). This means that in the standard set up the domestic quantity does not
depend on the foreign shock and the exporters supply the domestic market according
to the marginal cost and realization of D just like non-exporters. This means, the
standard set up predicts that the volatility of revenues changes in the size of the firm
as far as that is correlated with β, but there is not a structural difference between
exporters and non-exporters.
Prediction 4.2. The (total, domestic, and export) output volatility of a firm de-
creases with it’s size, irregardless of its exporting status.
It is easy to observe that all three coefficients of variation increase in the marginal
cost parameter β. Mills and Schumann (1985) show a similar result for firms that
compete in perfect competition and they attribute this relationship to size. Larger
firms are less flexible than small firms and supply the market at lower volatility.
The same relationship holds for our firms, as a firm’s mean output increases as β
8See Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
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decreases.
Prediction 4.3. Accounting for the size of the firm, the total volatility of an exporter
is larger than the total output volatility of a non exporter if the volatilities on the
foreign markets is relatively large compared to the relative size of the foreign market.
By dividing equation (21) by (19), we see that
cvoe(Qe)
cvo(qd)
=
√
1 +
σ2F
σ2D
(
1 +
E(F )− β
E(D)− β
)−1
(23)
Therefore, the coefficient of variation of total output for an exporter is greater than
that of a nonexporter if
cvoe(Qe) > cvo(qd)⇔
√
1 +
σ2F
σ2D
> 1 +
E(F )− β
E(D)− β (24)
Suppose the foreign and domestic markets are symmetric such that σF = σD and
E(D) = E(F ). Then the coefficient of variation of total output of the exporter is
√
2
2
σD
E(D)−β . Compare this to the total output volatility of the non-exporter
σD
E(D)−β .
Under symmetry, the total output volatility of the exporter is lower than the total
output volatility of the non-exporter. On first inspection this may seem counterin-
tuitive, as the exporter has a strictly higher volatility on the domestic market and
the foreign market compared to the non-exporter. However, that extra volatility is
small compared to the additional output an exporter produces compared to a non
exporter. This results in a lower coefficient of variation. On the other hand, the
total output volatility of an exporter increases as the foreign market size decreases
or the variance on the foreign market increases. Since firms usually ship a smaller
16
amount of quantity to the foreign market this likely results in a higher total output
volatility.
Mills and Schumann (1985) predict that bigger firms have lower total sales volatility,
which they interpret as a loss in flexibility. Prediction 4.3 shows that it is important
to break these results out by markets, because exporting provides an opportunity for
large firms to hedge. Our model suggests that exporters use both the domestic and
foreign markets to spread the volatility. As a result, exporting decreases the total
sales volatility, if the demand volatility on the foreign market is low relative to the
size of the market. Since exporters tend to be large compared to non exporters 9
this implies that large firms have low total sales volatility, because exporting allows
them to re allocate quantity across the domestic and international market instead of
a loss in flexibility.
Prediction 4.4. If exporting involves a higher total output volatility, then we expect
that input demands of the exporting firms are more volatile then the input demands
of the firms that supply only the domestic market.
This result is important to understand the requirements that exporting demands
of the local factor markets. Following prediction 4.3, if foreign markets are small
and volatile such that exporting increases total volatility, then we would expect that
exporters adjust their factor inputs more frequently than nonexporters. If the export
markets are large and stable, then exporters actually reduce their input adjustment
frequency. All of the above predictions rely on the premise that firms substitute
quantities across markets. The last prediction examines this channel directly.
9see, for example, Bernard and Jensen, 1995 for American firms and Munch and Nguyen, 2009
for Danish firms
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Prediction 4.5. Exporting firms substitute quantities across markets. Whenever
the supply to the foreign market is high, the supply to the domestic market is low.
To obtain predictions about the relative quantities on the domestic and foreign mar-
ket apply equations (7) and (8). From these supply equations observe that an increase
in the domestic demand raises the output the firm allocates to the home market and
lowers the supply to the domestic market and vice versa for a shock on the foreign
market. This prediction comes out of our assumption that the random variables D
and F are uncorrelated.
5. Data
Our data are gathered from Statistics Denmark’s Account Statistics dataset. We have
data for output (DKK), exports (DKK), and Six Digit Classification of Economic
Activities in the European Community (NACE) industry, for the years 1992-2006.
In addition, we have data on assets, energy, and capital for 1994-2006.
We also obtain total sales from Denmark’s Value Added Tax(VAT) data banks for
the years 1994-2006. Total sales data from the VAT closely track those from Ac-
count Statistics.10 From here on forth, we refer to the output data gathered from
annual firm statistics as firm sales. Those gathered from VAT data are referred to
as Alternate firm sales.
The Danish External Trade Statistics provides both values and weights of firm level
exports from 1992-2006. We compute our export prices as the quotient of the annual
10A regression of VAT sales on Account statistics output for the years 1994-2006 find a marginal
effect of 0.947 with a Std. Err of 0.00038.
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export value and export weight of a firm. In a robustness check, we drop the top
and the bottom percentile of both export prices and export weights. This does not
significantly change our results.
We compute annual domestic sales as the difference between firm sales and exports
for that year. We drop firms that had observations with negative firm sales, negative
exports, and negative domestic sales. There were 370 of 67871 firms that were
dropped due to these criteria.
Some firms keep their same name but change businesses entirely. In order to minimize
error from firms that keep the same CVR register but change output product, we
drop firms that switch their reported 2 digit industries. Out of our remaining 67501
firms, 2285 firms switched 2-digit NACE industries. Those 2285 firms were dropped.
On the other hand, many firms produce multiple products across several 6 digit
product classifications but only report a single product category on their annual
report. Firms usually report the 6 digit product in which they had the highest sales
that year. This may change from year to year. When we control for a firm’s 6-digit
product category, we use the firm’s modal 6 digit product category. In a robustness
check, we also use the firm’s initial product category - the results only differed in the
third or fourth significant digit.
Sometimes firm exit and then re-enter the dataset. This is probably due to clerical
error. We drop those 5377 firms that exit and re-entered the dataset. 59839 firms
remained.
We drop observations that had less than 1 employee or less than 1 DKK of sales. Of
the 371096 firm-year observations, we dropped 162622 observations because those
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firms had 0 employees that year. An additional 2559 observations were dropped
because the firms had fewer than 1 DKK of output.
After imposing the restrictions, we were left with 167434 observations comprising
27549 firms. Using this restricted dataset, we construct our Output Share as the
the firm’s share of sales within the 6 digit product category for each year. We also
construct 2-digit sector Output Shares. We label a firm an exporter if it reported
positive exports at least once during our sample period.
We then constructed the sales volatility of the remaining firms in the sample. To do
so, we regressed the log sales of a firm on a year trend and took the resultant root
mean square error as our measure of firm sales volatility. We performed the same
regressions to find the volatilities of each firm’s reported total sales, domestic sales,
total exports, export weights, employment, energy, capital, and assets. Finally, we
compute the industry sales volatility by regressing the log total industry sales for
each year on a year trend and using the resultant root mean square error.
In order to construct the sales volatility for a firm, we require that the firm have
positive sales for at least 3 years. Of the 27549 remaining firms, 3779 were in the
sample period for two years, and 4842 were in for only one year. We drop those firms
from our sample. Our final dataset comprises 18928 firms over the sample period of
15 years. Table 1 summarizes some statistics. As is usual in the literature, exporters
have higher sales, higher domestic sales, and employ more workers than firms on
average. Table 2 summarizes the calculated volatilities.
In our model, we assume that firms that supply to the export market also supply to
the domestic market. For the most part, our data is consistent with this assumption.
We find that 858 of our firms exported a total of 1463 firm-years without also sup-
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plying to the domestic. This is fewer than 3% of the firms in our sample and fewer
than 1% of our observations.
We also assume that our volatilities come from non-correlated demand shocks and not
cost shocks. This assumption is crucial for prediction 4.5. If cost shocks are the source
of volatility, we expect a positive correlation between export and domestic sales. If
demand shocks are the source, and foreign and domestic shocks are either negatively
correlated or uncorrelated, then we should see a negative correlation between foreign
and domestic sales. We find support for the latter. Table 3 presents regressions of
log exports on log domestic sales and log employment. When controlling for firm
size, we see that domestic and export sales are negatively correlated.
6. Results
6.1. Impact of Export Status on Domestic Supply Volatility
Table 4 shows that exporters supply the domestic market at a volatility 24 percent to
33 percent higher than that of non-exporters. Constant marginal cost trade models
cannot reconcile this difference, due to their independent domestic and export supply
decisions. This is evidence consistent with cost linkages that transmit volatility acorss
supply destinations.
An alternative explanation to cost linkages for our result is that across industries,
firms are subject to industry specific shocks which are systematically correlated with
the export potential of the industry. To mitigate this selection effect, specifications
one, two, and three limit the identifying variation to within NACE6 industry specific
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effects.11 Column four follows Mills and Schuman (1986) and absorbs cross-industry
differences in volatility using total industry sales volatility. Our identifying assump-
tion is that within NACE6 industries firms are subject to the same fundamentals
on the domestic market. Therefore, these firms are subject to the same long term
(annual) shocks.
Consistent with our theory, all specifications predict that larger firms have a lower
domestic supply volatility (prediction 4.2). Specifications one and three use employ-
ment as a proxy for size, while specifications two and four use total output share
within the NACE6 industry. Specification five uses both. Whether we account for
size with output share or employment, the relationship between the size and volatility
is essentially the same in sign and magnitude.
To be consistent with Mills and Schuman (1986), specifications three, four and five
also examine the impact of the capital intensity as a measure of size on the supply
volatility. Holding employment and/or output share fixed, firms that produce at a
higher capital intensity supply the market at a higher volatility. However, includ-
ing the capital intensity has essentially no impact on the coefficient of the other
variables. We draw two conclusions. First, at least in our sample this result is not
consistent with an interpretation that capital intensity proxies firm size. Instead, this
result suggests that all else equal, producing at high volatility requires investment
into flexible manufacturing and information processing to serve demand fluctuations.
Second, the capital intensity does not impact our estimates of interest. Consequently,
we drop the capital intensity from the following specifications.
11320 industries
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6.2. Bigger firms have lower volatility
Table 5 shows that for all three supply measures (total, export and domestic sales)
the volatility decreases in the size of the firm. In addition, the specification on total
and domestic sales include an interaction term between the firms export status and
firm size. In both specifications, the volatility of exporters decreases at a much faster
rate in firm size.
We draw three conclusions. First, on average the negative relationship between firm
size and volatility is not driven by hedging. Across total, export, and domestic
sales, the supply volatility is decreasing in size. Second, the interaction between firm
size and exporting suggests that small exporters are especially subject to high sales
volatility. Since small exporters are those that are on the margin of exporting (see
Melitz, 2003), these firms may not be able to use the export market to hedge in every
period. Third, the impact of exporting on volatility decreases in firm size. This may
be due to the firm’s presence in multiple export markets that is correlated with the
firm’s size.
6.3. Permanent Exporters have lower Total volatility
To further examine that the firms on the export margin have to manage substantial
increases in volatility, we note that all firms in our sample permanently supply the do-
mestic market. Export status is not as stable. Some firms are permanent exporters12,
others export in only some periods. We think of these latter firms as the marginal
exporters: period productivity shocks dictate whether they export in a given period.
Table 6 examines the difference between permanent exporters, marginal exporters
12meaning they export the entire time they are in the sample
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and non-exporters.
We find that both the permanent and marginal exporters have significantly greater
domestic volatilities than non exporters (column 1). Column two shows that all firms
share similar relationships between size and domestic volatility; the interaction terms
between export status and employment are insignificant. Column three shows that
compared to the non exporters and permanent exporters, marginal exporters have
a structurally higher total sales volatility. While it is true that on average across
all firms exporting leads to structurally higher total sales volatility, column three
shows that this result is driven by the high volatility of the marginal firms. Even
after accounting for size, permanent exporters display a structurally lower total sales
volatility even than the non exporters.
This suggests two conclusions. First, as stated in the results above, it is the firms
on the margin that are subject to the highest total sales volatility. Second, the low
total sales volatility of the permanent exports even accounting after size points to a
potential impact of hedging. The really large exporters are able to hedge away much
of their volatility. Further research involving destination-specific exports can pin
down whether large firms have lower volatility because they are better at hedging,
or whether they have access to more markets.
6.4. Input Volatility
The previous results don’t give a clear indication of what the impact of exporting
is on domestic factor markets. Small exporters have higher total volatility, but that
impact decreases in size. The impact on the domestic factor markets then depends
on the relationship between the volatility of factor demands and the firm size. We
estimate several specifications to see the impacts directly. We find the effect of
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employment size and exporting status on the volatilities of employment, energy, and
capital. Table 7 summarizes our results.
Across all specifications, input volatilities are negatively correlated with employment
size. This is intuitive since we expect input volatilities to be positively correlated
with output volatility.
Firms that export at least once have significantly higher employment, energy, and
capital volatilities. When we separate exporters into the WT and S subgroup, we
find that firms that exported the whole time have lower input volatilities. Those
that only exported sometimes have higher. We conclude that on average, exporting
results in a higher volatility of factor demands. The volatility increasing impact of
small exporters close to the export margin dominates the volatility reducing impact
of hedigng by the large exporters.
7. Robustness Checks
As a robustness check we repeat the exercise in Mills and Schumann (1985) with our
data. Results are summarized in column 1 of Table 8 with Mills and Schumann’s
(1985) results in column 4 to compare. We arrive at nearly the same conclusions as
as Mills and Schumann (1985). 13 Standard errors are larger in our results because
they are robust.
We also use an alternative data source (VAT sales instead of annnual firm statistics)
as our measure of output (Table 8, column 2) or two-digit industry controls instead
of six-digit (column 3). We find no significant difference in our results.
13with the addition of the export dummy. We also do it without the export dummy, and find
similar results
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Because not all firms are in the markets for all periods. We account for this selection
problem with controls for the number of observations. We augment our specifications
with indicators for the number of observations used to calculate total (or domestic)
volatility. These indicators absorb systematic variation in the output volatility, num-
ber of observation and size or export status. We report our estimations with those
additional controls in Table 9. The results and conclusions remain the same.
Finally, Table 10 reports estimates at the 25th, 50th, and 75th volatility quartiles to
show that our results are robust to outliers and are consistent across the distribution
of firms.
7.1. Alternate Theories
The quadratic term in our cost function generates a link between the marginal costs
of supplying the domestic and foreign destinations. The following section considers
alternate theories that could generate this prediction while maintaining a linear cost
structure.
First suppose heterogeneity in demand such that the demand equations are
pd = λD − qd (25)
pf = λF − qf (26)
where λ > 1 is a firm specific popularity (quality) term that add multiplicatively
to the reservation price. Firms with high λ have higher demands for given demand
shocks D and F. Let the total costs be
c(Q) = A+ βQ (27)
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Given these adjustments to the theory, the profit-maximizing export and domestic
quantities are
qf =
λF − β
2
if λF > β, else 0 (28)
qd =
λD − β
2
if λD > β, else 0 (29)
These quantity functions are the same whether the firm is an exporter or not. The
corresponding coefficients of variation are
cvoe(qe) =
σf
E [F ]− β
λ
(30)
cvo(qd) = cvoe(qd) =
σd
E [D]− β
λ
(31)
In this set-up, larger firms (low β or high λ) still have lower coefficients of variation.
However, since the coefficient of variation of domestic supply is identical for exporters
and non-exporters, this model predicts that, once controlling for size, exporters and
non exporters have identical domestic volatilities. Our estimation results reject this
prediction.
A second theory would have additive demand heterogeneity. In this case, the demand
equations would be
pd = λ+D − qd (32)
pf = λ+ F − qf (33)
where λ again is a firm specific popularity (quality) term. This time, it adds ad-
ditively to the reservation price. Given these adjustments, the product-maximizing
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export and domestic quantities are
qf =
λ+ F − β
2
if λ+ F > β, else 0 (34)
qd =
λ+D − β
2
if λ+D > β, else 0 (35)
These quantity functions are the same whether the firm is an exporter or not. The
corresponding coefficients of variation are
cvoe(qe) =
σf
E [F ]− β + λ (36)
cvo(qd) = cvoe(qd) =
σd
E [D]− β + λ (37)
In this additive scenario, an increase in λ affects the coefficient of variation in exactly
the same way as a decrease in β. Again, the cvo function is the same for exporters
and nonexporters: this theory does not generate the structural difference between
exporters and nonexporters. In short, our data rejects both theories of demand
heterogeneity and linear cost.
8. Conclusion
This paper examines the linkages between a firm’s foreign and domestic supplies.
Due to increasing marginal costs, a shock on any of the firm’s supplied markets
results in a reallocation of output across all supplied markets. These linkages reject
the constant marginal costs setup of standard trade models, where a firm’s supply
on a given market is independent of any of its other markets.
We cannot observe the firms’ cost structures directly. Instead, we derive predictions
relating the cost structures to domestic and total output volatilities. Our estima-
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tion results show that exporters experience greater volatilities in both domestic and
total sales than non exporters.According to our model, this implies that firms do
not manage market volatilities independently, but instead substitute output across
markets. This suggests that the ability to respond to demand volatility by flexibly
substituting sales across markets should be an important consideration in export
promotion programs. In addition, our regression results show that exporting results
in higher factor demand volatility. This implies that successful exporting depends
on the ability of factor markets to absorb this volatility.
Our results suggest some future research ideas. First, our finding that exporters have
higher domestic volatilities than nonexporters should be extended to the industry
level: does exporting actually increase industry volatility, or is this effect localized
to the firm? Second, our model suggests that exporting may smooth a firm’s total
sales volatility and our empirics show that large exporters have a lower total sales
volatility than small exporters. The firms’ ability to hedge volatility by exporting de-
pends on market characteristics such as size, volatility and the correlation of demand
fluctuations across multiple destination markets. Future research using destination-
specific export flows will shed light on the firms’ ability to smooth sales volatility by
choosing destination markets according to characteristics consistent with a hedging
strategy.
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APPENDIX
A-1. Optimization Cases
Case 1(Supply nowhere): λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0. This case says that the firm does
not supply any of the markets if the reservation price does not cover the minimal
marginal cost of production. From (5) and (6), λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0 ⇒ qd = 0, qf = 0.
From (3) and (4), qd = 0, qf = 0 ⇒ −D + β = λ1,−F + β = λ2. Then λ1 > 0 and
λ2 > 0 iff
β > D and β > F. (A-1)
Case 2(Supply Export): λ1 > 0, λ2 = 0. This case says that if the marginal
revenue on the domestic market for the first unit ouf output is less than the marginal
cost evaluated at the optimal quantity the firm ships to the foreign market, then the
firm ships only to the foreign market. From (5), λ1 > 0 ⇒ qd = 0. From (4),
qd = 0, λ2 = 0 ⇒ qf = 13(F − β). Substitute qf = 13(F − β) into (3) to obtain
β + F−β
3
= λ1 > 0 which is true iff
D ≤ 1
3
F +
2
3
β (A-2)
Case 3(Supply Domestic): λ1 = 0, λ2 > 0. This case says that the firm does not
export if the reservation price on the foreign market does not cover the marginal cost
of producing the optimal quantity for the domestic market. As long as the marginal
revenue on the domestic market is higher than on the foreign market the firm ships to
the domestic market. When the domestic market is supplied optimally, the marginal
cost at the optimal domestic quantity is higher than the maximum marginal revenue
the firm could obtain from selling to the foreign market. To see this formally, from
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(6), λ2 > 0⇒ qF = 0. From (3),
qd =
D − β
3
. (A-3)
Substitute qd = D−β
3
into (4) to obtain λ2 = β +
D−β
3
, which is true iff
F <
2
3
β +
1
3
D. (A-4)
To complete the argument note that 2
3
β + 1
3
D is the marginal cost at the optimal
quantity on the domestic market.
To rule out cases 1 to 3 we place restriction on the supports of the probability
distributions and the marginal cost parameter β
To rule out the first case we require that the initial marginal cost is lower than the
reservation price on both markets,
F > β and D > β. (A-5)
This restriction is reasonable, since we don’t observe firms that are never in the
market.
Next we rule out firms that only supply the foreign market, qd = 0, qf > 0, with the
restriction
D >
1
3
F¯ +
2
3
β¯. (A-6)
This restriction is consistent with the data, as 99 percent of the observations that
report a foreign transaction also report a domestic transaction.
Even before considering the fixed cost of entry, a firm may abstain from exporting
in some periods. This is the case if the support of F,D spreads across the cutoff
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condition for exports. This implies that some realization of F,D is favorable to
exporting and others are not. This pattern is true for about half of the exporting
firms in our sample and we examine it empiricaly. To keep the theory concise, we
dispense with this possibility with the restrictions
F >
1
3
D +
2
3
β (A-7)
and over all F ∈ (F , F ) and D ∈ (D,D),
β ≤ min
{
3D − F¯
2
,
3F − D¯
2
}
. (A-8)
Condition (A-8) defines an upper bound of β sufficiently low such that the inequality
conditions (A-6) and (A-7) do not intersect the support of the random variables
(F,D). Conditions (A-5), (A-6), (A-7) and (A-8) limit the possible response regions
to the case where the firm supplies both markets simultaneously.
A-2. Second Order Conditions
A-2.1. Case 3
The matrix of second partials is

∂2L
∂2qD
∂2L
∂qD∂qF
∂2L
∂qD∂λ2
∂2L
∂qF ∂qD
∂2L
∂2qF
∂2L
∂qF ∂λ2
∂2L
∂λ2∂qD
∂2L
∂λ2∂qF
∂2L
∂2λ2
 =

−3 −1 0
−1 −3 1
0 1 0

Given that we maximize over two variables with one active constraint we only have
to check whether the determinant of the matrix of second partials D is positive. For
this particulare solution D = 3 and the second order condition is satisfied.
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A-2.2. Case 4
Similar as for Case 3 the matrix of second partials is
 −3 −1
−1 −3

Given that we maximize over two variable with no active constrain we have to check
if (−1)iDi > 0, where Di is the lower right submatrix of the matrix of second partials
for i = 1, 2. Given the matrix (−1)1D1 = 3 > 0 and (−1)2D2 = 8 > 0. This solution
also satisfies the second order conditions.
A-3. Expected Profits when Firms Don’t Export in All Periods
To compute expected profits suppose the shocks D,F are independent and the prob-
ability distributions are degenerate such that the four possible events occurs with
probabilities P (D¯, F¯ ) = α1, P (D, F¯ ) = α2, P (D¯, F ) = α3, P (D,F ) = α4. For a
given β expected profits are then given by
E(pi, β) = α1max
{
pie(D¯, F¯ ), pi(D¯, F¯ )
}
+ α2max
{
pie(D, F¯ ), pi(D, F¯ )
}
+ α3max
{
pie(D,F ), pi(D,F )
}
+ α4max {pie(D,F ), pi(D,F )} (A-9)
Before paying the fixed cost of entry, the profits with and without exports are
pie(D,F ) =
1
4
[
1
4
(H − F )2 + 1
2
(H − β)2 + 1
2
(F − β)2
]
pi(D,F ) =
1
6
(H − β)2
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with the partial derivatives
∂pie(D,F )
∂β
= −1
4
H +
1
2
β − 1
4
F < 0
∂pi(D,F )
∂β
=
1
3
(β −H) < 0
Remeber from (A-4) that the firms sets exports to zero iff
F <
2
3
β +
1
3
D (A-10)
This inequality implies that ∂pi
e(D,F )
∂β
< ∂pi(D,F )
∂β
, whenever the (F,D) are such that
exporting is optimal. Note from (A-9) that the partial derivative of expected profits
with respect to β is a probability weighted sum of the partial derivatives of the
terms ∂pi
e(D,F )
∂β
and ∂pi(D,F )
∂β
. This means that if F > 2
3
β + 1
3
D for at least one of the
realizations of D,F , then the expected profits with exporting decrease at a faster rate
in β than the expected profits without exporting. This implies that as β decreases,
the expected profits with exports increase relative to the expected profits without
exports.
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All Firms Exporters
Statistic Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median
Sales 37.4 413 4.02 78.4 618 10.7
Log Sales 15.4 1.55 15.2 16.3 1.66 16.19
Domestic Sales 23.1 280 3.52 42.4 388 6.89
Log Domestic Sales 15.24 1.45 15.1 15.8 1.67 15.8
Employment 26.7 182 5 52.7 255 12
Exports 36 345 0.95
Log Exports 15.0 2.43 15.1
No. of firms 18928 7509
Table 1: Summary Statistics. Non-log in Millions of DKK
Mean Std. Dev Median
Volatility of
Total Sales 0.28 0.25 0.21
Total Sales (VAT) 0.28 0.27 0.20
Domestic Sales 0.32 0.31 .023
Export Sales 0.48 0.49 0.35
Energy 0.46 0.33 0.41
Employment 0.24 0.21 0.19
Capital 0.48 0.44 0.36
Assets 0.31 0.29 0.23
Table 2: Volatility Summary Statistics
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Specification
(1) (2)
Domestic Sales -.483 -.105
(.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
Employment 1.60 0.989
(.008)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Controls None NACE6
Obs. 50658 50658
R2 0.546 0.915
F statistic 19.442
Table 3: Export Sales Regressions, with and without Industry Dummies
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exported at least once .240 .244 .238 .320 .330
(.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Employment -.033 -.033 -.018
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗
NACE6 Output Share -.033 -.024 -.015
(.006)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗
Capital Intensity .036 .013 .015
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗ (.008)∗∗
Industry Volatility .067 .061
(.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Const. -1.539 -1.790 -1.213 -1.489 -1.409
(.013)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗ (.072)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗
Controls NACE6 NACE6 NACE6 None None
Obs. 18945 18945 17911 17911 17911
R2 .083 .083 .091 .032 .032
F statistic 101.7 102.6 73.9 143.7 117.1
Table 4: Domestic Sales Volatility Regressions, Robust Std. Err’s
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Total Sales Export Sales Domestic Sales
(1) (2) (3)
Exported at least once .224 .278
(.027)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗
Exported x Employment -.084 -.021
(.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗
Employment -.023 -.095 -.021
(.010)∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗
Const. -1.561 -.709 -1.555
(.016)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Controls NACE6 NACE6 NACE6
Obs. 19013 5759 18945
R2 .056 .109 .083
F statistic 75.4 95.7 69.4
Table 5: Volatility Regressions with Interaction terms, Robust Std. Err’s
Domestic Sales Total Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Permanent Exporters .190 .247 -.120 .073
(.024)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.041)∗
Perm Exp x Employment -.022 -.080
(.015) (.014)∗∗∗
Marginal Exporters .261 .262 .155 .190
(.017)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗
Marg Exp x Employment -.003 -.029
(.015) (.015)∗
Employment -.028 -.020 -.052 -.021
(.007)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗
Const. -1.545 -1.555 -1.517 -1.559
(.013)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Controls NACE6 NACE6 NACE6 NACE6
Obs. 18945 18945 19013 19013
R2 .084 .084 .061 .063
F statistic 74.9 45.4 123.3 88.4
Table 6: Volatility Regressions: Permanent and Marginal Exporters, Robust Std.
Err’s
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Employment Energy Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exported at least once .041 .064 .052
(.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗
Permanent Exporters -.079 -.066 -.120
(.022)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗
Marginal Exporters .094 .115 .118
(.016)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗
Employment -.235 -.221 -.066 -.051 -.110 -.091
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Const. -1.138 -1.156 -.834 -.849 -.862 -.883
(.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Controls NACE6 NACE6 NACE6 NACE6 NACE6 NACE6
Obs. 17053 17053 15940 15940 15824 15824
R2 .158 .162 .104 .109 .076 .081
F statistic 912.0 642.1 56.3 71.8 115.1 115.1
Table 7: Input Volatility Regressions, Robust Std. Err’s
Total VAT Sector Results from
Sales Sales Controls MS1985
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exported at least once .115 .133 .292
(.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Employment -.023
(.006)∗∗∗
NACE6 Output Share -.050 -.036 -.292
(.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Capital Intensity .011 .013 .032 -.115
(.007) (.007)∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.063)∗
Industry Volatility .087 .050 .460
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗
Const. -1.629 -1.649 -1.284 -3.459
(.070)∗∗∗ (.069)∗∗∗ (.063)∗∗∗ (.231)∗∗∗
Controls None None NACE2 None
Obs. 17977 17891 17911 856
R2 .013 .008 .049 .271
F statistic 55.8 33.7 124.6
Table 8: Mills and Schumann (1985) Robustness Check, Robust Std. Err’s
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Domestic Sales Total Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exported at least once .224 .056
(.017)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Permanent Exporters .246 .079
(.044)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗
Perm Exp x Employment -.022 -.078
(.015) (.014)∗∗∗
Marginal Exporters .219 .144
(.032)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗
Marg Exp x Employment .008 -.017
(.015) (.015)
Employment -.038 -.030 -.078 -.031
(.006)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Const. -1.332 -1.342 -1.312 -1.373
(.028)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗
Controls NACE6 NACE6 NACE6 NACE6
# Obs # Obs # Obs # Obs
Obs. 18945 18945 19013 19013
R2 .105 .106 .076 .084
F statistic 52.2 43.9 52.0 58.2
Table 9: Volatility Regressions, Controlling for the number of observations for each
firm, Robust Std. Err’s
First-Quartile Median Third-Quartile
(1) (2) (3)
Exported at least once .309 .240 .184
(5.75e-15)∗∗∗ (2.62e-15)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗
Exported x Employment -.043 -.017 .008
(2.55e-15)∗∗∗ (1.11e-15)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗
Employment -.002 -.032 -.046
(2.07e-15)∗∗∗ (8.74e-16)∗∗∗ (.0003)∗∗∗
Const. -1.313 -1.243 -1.191
(5.46e-15)∗∗∗ (2.48e-15)∗∗∗ (.0008)∗∗∗
Controls NACE6 NACE6 NACE6
Obs. 18945 18945 18945
e(q) .25 .5 .75
Table 10: Quartile Regressions of Domestic Volatility, Robust Std. Err’s
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